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Abstract
This Article focuses on the effects of introduction of citizenship of the European Union (or
“Union”) into the Treaty establishing the European Community (the “EC Treaty”) by the Maas-
tricht Treaty. It has been accompanied by an explosion of writing on its significance for the de-
velopment of the European Union. Some of this writing is critical; some questions whether Union
citizenship can be a “genuine” citizenship or is rather an ill-judged attempt to create a European
identity where none exists. It is not the writers alone who have examined citizenship; lawyers and
the courts have also done so. The Court of Justice has once again found a vehicle for constitution-
alizing an idea which, at first glance, looked unpromising in the words of the Treaty provisions.
Notions of citizenship and citizenship entitlements have not just operated in the traditional con-
text of the free movement of persons, but have also influenced approaches to governance in the
European Union.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizenship does not appear to be a lawyer's concept, but
rather that of the social scientist. General legal literature seldom
discusses the concept of citizenship explicitly, save perhaps in
the context of immigration law. The literature of the social sci-
ences, however, is replete with discussions of the concept.' For
Thomas Humphrey Marshall, there were three basic elements to
citizenship. The first was the political element: the right to par-
ticipate in the exercise of political power as a citizen and elector.
Second, there was the social element: the right of citizens to
enjoy minimum standards of welfare and security with access to
institutions designed to deliver those goals. Finally, there was
the civil element: the rights necessary for individual freedom,
including a right to justice, offering due process of law.
The social science literature identifies two types of mecha-
nism for the delivery of citizenship rights: the :participatory and
bureaucratic models.2 The bureaucratic model tends to stress
the ability to offer an efficient and rational distribution of re-
sources necessary for all citizens to receive appropriate entitle-
ments to their rights.3 The participatory model tends to have
wider terms of reference than the bureaucratic model and en-
courages a cooperative approach between itself and the con-
sumer of services.4 The priorities of the consumer become as
important as the institutional goals and objectives set for the sys-
tem. Citizenship appears to be about the rights and duties of
natural persons rather than artificial legal persons, such as as-
* Professor of Law at the University of Leicester, and Member of the Faculty of
Law's Center for European Law and Integration.
1. See, most notably, T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT (1976). For an example of legal literature on citizenship, see RIGHTS OF CITIZEN-
SHIP (Robert Blackburn ed., 1993).
2. See generally JAMES W. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (advocating
the bureaucratic model); Zhiyong Lan & David H. Rosenbloom, Public Administration in
Transition?, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the participatory model).
3. See generally LANDIS, supra note 2 (advocating the bureaucratic model).
4. SeeJohn DeWitt et al., What Will New Governance Mean for the Federal Government?,
54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170, 171-73 (1994).
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sociations and companies. There has, however, been increasing
focus in recent years on notions of corporate social responsibil-
ity, which have often been presented in terms of corporate citi-
zenship.5
Citizenship involves entitlement to rights. It also assumes
some form of participation. Participation assumes knowledge.
That may be knowledge of the law, of procedure, or of processes
for seeking redress. The essence of participation is the ability to
make free and informed choices about the course of action to be
pursued.
The introduction of citizenship of the European Union (or
"Union") into the Treaty establishing the European Community
(the "EC Treaty") by the Maastricht Treaty has been accompa-
nied by an explosion of writing on its significance for the devel-
opment of the European Union.6 Some of this writing is critical;
some questions whether Union citizenship can be a "genuine"
citizenship or is rather an ill-judged attempt to create a Euro-
pean identity where none exists. 7 It is not the writers alone who
have examined citizenship; lawyers and the courts have also
done so. The Court of Justice has once again found a vehicle for
constitutionalizing an idea which, at first glance, looked un-
promising in the words of the Treaty provisions. Notions of citi-
zenship and citizenship entitlements have not just operated in
the traditional context of the free movement of persons, but
have also influenced approaches to governance in the European
Union.'
5. See, for example, HALINA WARD, LEGAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
(2003), available at http://www.iied.org/SM/CR/documents/legalissues-Corporate.
pdf.
6. For just a flavor of the writing on citizenship, see ELIZABETH MEEHAN, CITIZEN-
SHIP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993); SIOFRA O'LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT
OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP: FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZEN-
SHIP (1996);J.H.H. WEILER, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in THE CON-
STITUTION OP EUROPE 324 (1999); Nick Barber, Citizenship, Nationalism and the European
Union, 27 EUR. L. REV. 241 (2002); Roy W. Davis, Citizenship of the Union ... Rights for
All?, 27 EUR. L. REV. 121 (2002); Norbert Reich, Union Citizenship-Metaphor or Source of
Rights, 7 EUR. L.J. 4 (2001); and Jo Shaw, The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the
European Union, 22 EUR. L. REV. 554 (1997).
7. For a helpful discussion of constructing a citizenship shared by many nationali-
ties, see Kalypso Nicolaidis, Our European Demoi-cracy: Is This Constitution a Third Way for
Europe?, in WHOSE EUROPE? NATIONAL MODELS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 137 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2003), available at
http://www.europeanstudies.ox.ac.uk/WhoseEurope.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Paul Magnette, Citizenship in the European Union, in WHOSE EUROPE?
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I. THE ORIGINS AND INGREDIENTS OF CITIZENSHIP
A. Origins
The concept of European citizenship as part of the political
development of the European Community (or "Community")
appears to have first been mentioned at the Paris Summit in Oc-
tober 1972.' It was elaborated in the Tindemans Report on Eu-
ropean Union." The Tindemans Report saw two key develop-
ments contributing to the evolution of the European Union: the
development of a passport union, and the development of politi-
cal rights taking effect across national frontiers. The former no-
tion has come to nothing, though future developments may take
place under Title IV of the EC Treaty on visas, asylum, immigra-
tion, and other policies related to the free movement of persons.
The latter is now reflected in the Treaty provisions on citizen-
ship of the Union.
The Fontainebleau European Council of June 1984 set up
an ad hoc committee chaired by Pietro Adonnino which issued
two reports on a people's Europe.11 The first report presented
to the Brussels European Council in March 1985 concerned ex-
tended rights of free movement, 2 while the second presented to
the Milan European Council in June 1985 dealt with special
rights for citizens and the creation of a more clearly understood
European identity."3 The first real step in the establishment of
citizenship of the Union is credited to the Spanish Government
in September 1990,14 and the idea is also reflected in position
papers from the Commission and the Danish Government that
NATIONAL MODELS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 7, at
130.
9. For background information on the concept of European citizenship, see JOHN
HANDOLL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE EU ch. 9 (1995); O'LEARY, supra note 6,
at 17-23; and FRIEDL WEISS & FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WITHIN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ch. 8 (2002).
10. Report on European Union, E.C. BULL. SuPP., no. 1 (1976).
11. A People's Europe: Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, 18 E.C. BULL., no.
6, at 21 (1985) [hereinafter Milan Report]; Report from the Ad Hoc Committee on a
People's Europe, 18 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 111 (1985) [hereinafter Brussels Report].
12. See Brussels Report, supra note 11, at 111-16.
13. See Milan Report, supra note 11, at 21-23.
14. See Spanish Delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political
Union, The Road to European Citizenship (Sept. 24, 1990) (unpublished Council doc-
ument SN 3940/90), reprinted in THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL
UNION: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, NEW POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY 328 (Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1992).
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followed shortly afterwards. The Spanish proposal was to bring
existing rights together with new rights so that the privileged po-
sition of the economic migrant would become entitlements of a
citizen of the European Union.1" The Commission's position
paper referred to fundamental rights arising under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. But it was also clear that
Union citizenship would be additional to nationality and citizen-
ship of a Member State.
Part Two of the Treaty on European Union amended the
EC Treaty to include provisions on citizenship of the Union. Ar-
ticles 17 to 22 of the EC Treaty now contain the provisions on
citizenship of the Union.16 These are very similar to the provi-
sions that were previously inserted by the Treaty of Maastricht.17
Article 17 provides:
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every per-
son holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citi-
zen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall comple-
ment and not replace national citizenship.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by
this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed
thereby."'
Citizenship in its classical sense involves duties as well as
rights: typically, service in the armed forces of the State of citi-
zenship (if required), and payment of taxes. There are no du-
ties currently attached to citizenship of the European Union.
Citizenship in the European Union is additional to citizen-
ship of the State of nationality and is not intended to replace it.
It is the holding of the nationality of one of the Member States
that automatically gives rise to citizenship of the Union. Each
Member State is free to have its own rules for the grant of na-
tionality, but a State may not use its internal rules to deny recog-
nition of the nationality of another Member State. 9 For exam-
ple, some Member States do not recognize one of a number of
15. See id. at 330.
16. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
arts. 17-22, O.J. C 325/33, at 44-46 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
17. Treaty on European Union arts. 8-8c, O.J. C 191/01, at 7 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 247,
259.
18. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 17, O.J. C 325/33, at 44 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, C-369/90 M.V. Micheletti and Others v.
Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 623 (1993).
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nationalities where the center of the individual's activities has
not been in that State, because the individual has never lived
there and has little connection with that State.2 °
Article 22 of the EC Treaty provides:
The Commission shall report to the European Parliament, to
the Council and to the Economic and Social Committee every
three years on the application of the provisions of this Part.
This report shall take account of the development of the
Union.
On this basis, and without prejudice to the other provisions of
this Treaty, the Council acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Par-
liament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or add to the
rights laid down in this Part, which it shall recommend to the
Member States for adoption in accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional requirements. 21
It should be noted that the rights attaching to Union citi-
zenship can only be expanded under this provision; they cannot
be reduced. Member State caution in this area, however, is re-
flected in the use of the consultation procedure for the adoption
of provisions enhancing Union citizenship.
22
B. Movement and Residence
Article 18(1) of the EC Treaty provides: "Every citizen of
the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and
conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted
to give it effect. ' 23
The right to be free from immigration control is a classic
incident of nationality. Subject to limited exceptions, interna-
tional law precludes the removal of a State's own nationals from
its territory.2 4 International law also requires a State to admit its
20. See Micheletti v. Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, Case C-369/90, [1992]
E.C.R. 1-4239, noted in d'Oliveira, supra note 19.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 22, O.J. C 325/33, at 46 (2002).
22. Note that measures under Article 18 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (the "EC Treaty") are to be adopted using the cooperation procedure ex-
cept in relation to passports, identity cards, residence permits and similar documents,
and social security and social protection. See id. art. 18, O.J. C 325/33, at 45 (2002).
23. Id.
24. See Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, The Movement of Persons Across Borders, 23 STUD.
TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y i, 85 (1992).
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own nationals to its territory.2 5 Article 18(1) is a step in the di-
rection of recognition of such a right, but it is expressed to be
subject to the limitations and conditions in the Treaty and in
Community secondary legislation. This would appear to have
added nothing to existing rights of free movement. That said, by
the time this provision found its way into the Treaty, there was a
portfolio of provisions which gave a substantial proportion of the
nationals of the Member States the right to move and reside in
the country of their choice. Those who are, or have been for the
requisite qualifying period, economically active are covered by
the rights given to workers, the self-employed, and service prov-
iders and recipients by the EC Treaty. 26 Those who are not eco-
nomically active are covered by the free-movement directives
governing retired persons, students, and persons of independent
means. 27  The only group for which express provision is not
made is the economically inactive who lack the resources to be
financially self-sufficient.
The purpose of the Retired Persons Directive is to permit
retired persons, who do not otherwise have the right,28 to reside
in the Member State of their choice with their families. The di-
rective governing persons of independent means grants a choice
of Member State of residence to those not falling within the
25. See id. at 39.
26. See EC Treaty, supra note 16, pt. 3, tit. 3, O.J. C 325/33, at 51 (2002).
27. See Council Directive No. 93/96/EEC on the Right of Residence for Students,
OJ. L 317/59 (1993) [hereinafter Students Directive] (replacing Council Directive No.
90/366/EEC, O.J. L 180/30 (1990), annulled by European Parliament v. Council of the
European Communities, Case C-295/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4193 (directive had not been
made under the correct legal base)); see also Council Directive No. 90/365/EEC on the
Right of Residence for Employees and Self-Employed Persons Who Have Ceased Their
Occupational Activity, O.J. L 180/28 (1990) [hereinafter Retired Persons Directive];
Council Directive No. 90/364/EEC on the Right of Residence, OJ. L 180/26 (1990)
[hereinafter Independent Means Directive] (sometimes referred to as the "Playboy Di-
rective"). These directives are now consolidated into Council Directive No. 2004/38/
EC on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and
Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, O.J. L 158/77 (2004), corrected
version in OJ. L 229/35 (2004) [hereinafter Citizenship Directive] (amending Regula-
tion (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing Directive Nos. 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/
194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC, and 93/
96/EEC). Note that the Directive is incorrectly numbered 2004/58/EC in the English
language version of the Official Journal. This Directive enters into force on April 30,
2006.
28. See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1251/70 on the Right of Workers
to Remain in the Territory of a Member State After Having Been Employed in That
State, O.J. L 142/24 (1970).
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scope of the retired persons directive who are of independent
means. In the case of both directives, the applicants must have
sufficient resources "to avoid becoming a burden on the social
[security/assistance] system of the host Member State during
their period of residence. '29 Such means are defined in Article
1 of Directive 90/364/EEC and in Article 1 of Directive 90/365/
EEC as follows:
The resources referred to . . . shall be deemed sufficient
where they are higher than the level of resources below which
the host Member State may grant social assistance to its na-
tionals, taking into account the personal circumstances of the
applicant and, where appropriate, the personal circumstances
of persons admitted pursuant to paragraph 2 [family mem-
bers admitted with the applicant].
Where [the above paragraph] cannot be applied in a Mem-
ber State, the resources of the applicant shall be deemed suf-
ficient if they are higher than the level of the minimum social
security pension paid by the host Member State.3°
The Commission has established guidelines on the applica-
tion of the sufficient resources test in these directives.3 ' Member
States should only require evidence up to the level of minimum
resources applicable under the directives and should not investi-
gate the general financial situation of the applicant. In particu-
lar, pensions are seen as a stable source of income; if the amount
of a pension exceeds the sufficient resources threshold, no fur-
ther evidence should be sought. The nature and provenance of
the resources are irrelevant as long as the applicant has free and
effective access to them. The resources of partners should be
treated in the same way as the Member State treats such re-
sources in internal situations. Finally, family members depen-
dent on the applicant must be able to invoke the resources com-
ing from the applicant.
The applicant must also be covered by sickness insurance in
respect of all risks in the host Member State. The requirement is
29. Retired Persons Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, OJ. L 180/28, at 28 (1990); see
also Independent Means Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, O.J. L 180/26, at 26 (1990).
30. Retired Persons Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, O.J. L 180/28, at 28 (1990); see
also Independent Means Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, OJ. L 180/26, at 26 (1990).
31. See Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission
to the Council and the European Parliament on the Implementation of Directives 90/
264, 90/365 and 93/96, COM (99) 127 Final, at 15-16 (Mar. 1999).
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expressed in very general terms, and will be satisfied through
private insurance, or social insurance arising either in the host
Member State or elsewhere.
Those within the scope of these directives are entitled to a
Community residence permit lasting for five years, though it may
be subject to revalidation after the first two years.32
The Court of Justice has confirmed in Commission v. Italy3 3
that Member States must adopt a flexible approach to the docu-
ments required to establish an entitlement under these direc-
tives. Limiting the types of proof of entitlement and requiring
certification of documentation by another Member State went
beyond what was permitted under these directives.
The Students Directive is somewhat different, since it pro-
vides for a temporary right of residence for the purposes of edu-
cation. It is designed to ensure free movement of students and
their families in order to guarantee them access to vocational
education in any Member State. The rights in the directive are
subsidiary to the rights that flow from other provisions of Com-
munity law.3 4 There are three conditions that must be satisfied:
1. The student must have been accepted to attend a vocational
training course in another Member State at a recognized edu-
cational establishment and be enrolled in that course.
2. The student must have sufficient resources to avoid becoming
a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member
State during the student's period of residence.
3. The student must be covered by sickness insurance in respect
of all risks in the host Member State.35
So long as the principal purpose of the residence is to fol-
low the vocational training course, it does not appear to matter
that the course is part-time rather than full-time, as long as the
other conditions are met.36 The host Member State's inquiry
32. See Council Directive No. 68/360/EEC on the Abolition of Restrictions on
Movement and Residence Within the Community for Workers of Member States and
Their Families, art. 6, O.J. L 257/13, at 14 (1968). Note, however, that the system of
residence permits for workers is not continued under Directive No. 2004/38/EC. A
system of residence cards is, however, introduced for family members. See Citizenship
Directive, supra note 27, art. 6, O.J. L 229/35, at 39 (2004).
33. Commission v. Italy, Case C-424/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4001.
34. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 77/486/EEC on the Education of the Children
of Migrant Workers, 0.J. L 199/32 (1977).
35. See Students Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, 0.J. L 317/59, at 60 (1993).
36. Note that a person working part-time and studying part-time would almost cer-
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into the student's possession of sufficient resources is different
from the other directives. Article 1 of the Students Directive
merely provides that "the student assures the relevant national
authority, by means of a declaration or by such alternative means
as the student may choose that are at least equivalent," that he or
she possesses sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden
on the host Member State. 37 Article 3 makes clear, however, that
the student is not entitled, under the directive, to receive any
maintenance grant from the host Member State.3 8 Those who
meet the requirements of the directive are entitled to a Commu-
nity residence permit, "which may be limited to the duration of
the studies or to one year where the course lasts longer; in the
latter event it shall be renewable annually. '39
In Commission v. Italy,4 ° the Court of Justice ruled that Italy
had gone beyond the limits of its discretion under the Students
Directive in specifying the level of resources a student must show
and the manner in which his or her possession of those re-
sources must be proved. The Court appeared to approve com-
ments made in argument by the Commission that a more re-
laxed approach to resources is justified in relation to students,
because it is far easier for students to supplement resources by
income from work, but that it would be difficult to produce
proof in advance that a student will supplement income in this
way.
4 1
The term "vocational training course" is not defined in the
directive, but it is clear from case law of the Court of Justice that
this is to be interpreted widely. It would appear to cover any
form of education that prepares a person for a profession, trade,
or employment, including university courses, save only for those
courses undertaken by individuals for their general knowledge
and not as preparation for an occupation.4 2
The Court of Justice has, however, ruled that Article 18 of
tainly be a worker within Article 39 of the EC Treaty and be governed by rights flowing
from his or her worker status.
37. Students Directive, supra note 27, art. 1, O.J. L 317/59, at 60 (1993).
38. See id. art. 3, O.J. L 317/59, at 60 (1993).
39. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 317/59, at 60 (1993).
40. Commission v. Italy, Case C-424/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4001.
41. See id. at 1-4034, 45.
42. See Blaizot v. City of Liege, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379, 380, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 57, 57; see also Gravier v. City of Liege, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593, 605,
[1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 15.
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the EC Treaty gives a right to free movement independent of
these specific provisions which is directly effective.43 The result
is that Article 18 grants rights to move and reside for all citizens
of the Union, subject only to their not presenting an unreasona-
ble financial burden on the host Member State. In effect, all but
the very poor enjoy complete freedom to move and reside in any
of the Member States.
C. Standing and Voting in Elections
Article 19(1) of the EC Treaty gives "every citizen of the
Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national"
the right to vote, and to stand as a candidate, at municipal elec-
tions in the Member State of residence under the same condi-
tion as apply to nationals of that Member State.4 4
Article 19(2) gives corresponding rights to vote, and to
stand as a candidate, in elections to the European Parliament.45
There is a limitation in the implementing legislation which per-
mits the host Member State to derogate from the granting of
voting and standing rights where the proportion of nationals of
other Member States reaches one-fifth of the relevant electorate.
In such circumstances, a residence requirement may be attached
to the eligibility to vote4 6 and to the eligibility to stand as a candi-
date."
43. See Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-413/99, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-7091, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 23, discussed in Michael Dougan & Eleanor Spaventa,
Educating Rudy and the (Non-)English Patient: A Double-Bill on Residency Rights Under Article
18 EC, 28 EUR. L. Rav. 699 (2003); see also Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9925, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 48.
44. Article 19(1) goes on to indicate that this entitlement is to be subject to de-
tailed arrangements adopted by the Council. These arrangements can be found in
Council Directive No. 94/80/EEC Laying Down Detailed Arrangements for the Exer-
cise of the Right to Vote and to Stand as a Candidate in Municipal Elections, O.J. L
368/38 (1994), amended by O.J. L 122/12 (1996). Certain posts, such as those of mayor
and deputy mayor, may be reserved for nationals of the Member State.
45. Again, the right is subject to implementing measures adopted by the Council.
These measures can be found in Council Directive No. 93/109/EEC Laying Down De-
tailed Arrangements for the Exercise of the Right to Vote and to Stand as a Candidate
in Elections to the European Parliament, O.J. L 329/34 (1993) [hereinafter European
Parliament Elections Directive], and the European Parliament Resolution on Voting
Rights in European Elections, O.J. C 44/159 (1994).
46. Such requirements are capped at a maximum of five years. See European Par-
liament Elections Directive, supra note 45, art. 14(a), O.J. L 329/34, at 37 (1993).
47. Residence requirements for candidacy are capped at a maximum of ten years.
See id. art. 14(b), O.J. L 329/34, at 37 (1993).
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These provisions do give new rights by decoupling eligibility
to stand and vote in these elections from the holding of the na-
tionality of the Member State in which the elections are held.
Note that the extension of voting rights and eligibility to stand
does not extend to voting and standing in national elections.
D. Diplomatic and Consular Protection
Article 20 of the EC Treaty provides for diplomatic and con-
sular representation to be afforded to citizens of the Union by
the representatives of any other Member State in a country
where the Member State of his or her nationality does not have
such representation.48 Member States are required to "establish
the necessary rules among themselves and start the international
negotiations required to secure this protection."49
The wording of this provision may not accord with the gen-
erally understood position in relation to the obligation of States
to exercise diplomatic and consular protection. International
law recognizes the entitlement of a State to exercise such protec-
tion but does not require it to do so; it is a matter for the discre-
tion of the State." The wording of Article 20 suggests that diplo-
matic and consular protection is an entitlement of Union citi-
zens as a matter of Community law. This was almost certainly
not intended, and an interpretation which conforms to well-un-
derstood propositions of international law in this regard is likely
to be preferred. The reference in Article 20 to enjoyment of the
rights on the same condition as nationals would justify such an
interpretation.
E. Complaints Mechanisms
Article 21 of the EC Treaty recognizes the right of citizens
48. See EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 20, O.J. C 325/33, at 45 (2002).
49. For Community implementing measures, see Decision of the Representatives
of the Governments of the Member States No. 95/553/EC Regarding Protection for
Citizens of the European Union by Diplomatic and Consular Representations, O.J. L
314/73 (1995), and Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States No. 96/409/CFSP on the Establishment of an Emergency Travel Document, O.J.
L 168/4 (1996). For guidance on the assistance which can be expected, see the Euro-
pean Union website, Consular and Diplomatic Protection, available at http://europa.
eu.int/youreurope/nav/en/citizens/factsheets/uk/rightsoutsideeu/consularprotec-
tion/en.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
50. See, e.g., Aleksandr Shapovalov, Should a Requirement of "Clean Hands"Be a Prereq-
uisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic Protection?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 829, 851 (2005).
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of the Union to petition the European Parliament under Article
194 and to apply to the Ombudsman established under Article
195. 5' Finally, Article 21 provides that every citizen may write to
the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the
Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Commission of the
Regions, the Economic and Social Committee, and the
Ombudsman in one of the official languages of the Union and
have an answer in the same language.52
II. CITIZENSHIP AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Discussions of citizenship have often, and unsurprisingly,
touched on issues of fundamental rights. Though the identifica-
tion of rights attaching to citizenship of the Union is an impor-
tant ingredient in the discussion of citizenship, care should be
taken not to present fundamental rights as being rights of citi-
zenship. If rights are fundamental, then they are to be accorded
to all within the jurisdiction of the European Union, and not
merely to its citizens. That has always been the position under
the European Convention on Human Rights, which operates
within the framework of the Council of Europe.53
The introduction by solemn declaration in December 2000
of the European Union's own Charter of Fundamental Rights54
has potentially clouded the debate. The casual reader might as-
sume that this document mirrored the European Convention on
Human Rights. It is, however, a document which is not legally
binding, which goes well beyond the rights covered in the Euro-
pean Convention, and which contains rights for citizens as well
as rights for all within the jurisdiction of the European Union.55
These are not always distinguished as carefully as they might be.
51. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction to consider complaints of maladministration
by the institutions of the Union (except the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance acting in their judicial capacity). See EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 195, O.J. C
325/33, at 115 (2002).
52. See id.
53. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,
amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155, 33 I.L.M. 960.
54. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364/1 (2000)
[hereinafter EU Charter].
55. For a detailed consideration of the EU Charter, see THE EUROPEAN UNION
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004).
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So, for example, in Chapter V of the Charter entitled "Citizens
Rights," Article 45 deals with the citizen's rights of freedom of
movement and residence within the territory of the Union,56
while Article 41 deals with the right to good administration,
which is said to belong to "every person" and not just citizens.
The issue of entitlement to good governance provides an inter-
esting illustration of the interface between fundamental rights
and citizenship.
III. CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNANCE
One of the areas of Community law that has generated both
debate and criticism of the position adopted by the Community,
is the ability of individuals to challenge the legality of Commu-
nity acts. The EC Treaty originally provided for such challenges
in Article 173, which has now become, in amended form, Article
230.5 8 Member States, the Commission, the Council, and the
European Parliament are referred to as privileged applicants
since there are no admissibility hurdles for them. They have
standing to bring actions for annulment. The European Central
Bank and the Court of Auditors are often referred to as semi-
privileged applicants since they have standing to challenge the
legality of Community acts only in order to protect their prerog-
atives. The individual, however, faces formidable hurdles in es-
tablishing standing to bring such proceedings save in the case of
a decision addressed to the applicant.59
Article 230 reads: "Any natural or legal person may... insti-
tute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual
concern to the former. 60
Over time, some of the rigors of the test have been mollified
in order to allow access to challenge the legality of Community
acts by private parties, especially in the field of anti-dumping reg-
56. See EU Charter, supra note 54, art. 45, O.J. C 364/1, at 19 (2000).
57. See id. art. 41, O.J. C 364/1, at 18 (2000).
58. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126 (2002).
59. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ch.
12 (2003); see also CAROL HARLow, ACCOUNTABILirY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 48-51
(2002); Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since Codorniu,
38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7 passim (2001).
60. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126 (2002).
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ulation and competition law.61 However, the overall tenor of the
case law has been a restrictive approach to standing for individu-
als to challenge Community acts. This restrictive approach stood
in marked contrast to the expansive approach taken in other ar-
eas of interpretation of the treaties. Doctor Adam Cygan places
the issue squarely in the context of governance, and warrants
extensive quotation:
The [Commission White Paper on European Governance] ac-
cepts that participatory democracy is created from the bottom
up by "groups of people dedicated to the disinterested search
for the public interest in society." This statement recognises
that participation goes beyond the pre-legislative lobbying
process. It suggests that the representation and protection of
citizens' interests require ex postjudicial protection in circum-
stances where the legislative measure breaches fundamental
rights or if its application infringes principles of procedural
propriety. The only vehicle for such judicial protection at the
Community level is paragraph 4 of Article 230 EC, which al-
ready provides recourse to individuals who are "directly and
individually concerned" by an act of the institutions. Direct
actions under Article 230 EC are preferable to the indirect
protection available in national courts when a preliminary
reference can be made under Article 234 EC. This is because
national courts cannot declare a Community measure invalid
or provide a remedy against the Commission. Despite these
deficiencies with domestic enforcement actions, the Court's
judgments have been consistently of the view that the grant-
ing of locus standi under Article 230 EC should be narrowly
construed and most significantly does not extend to judicial
review actions by representative groups. This is in stark con-
trast to the practice within the domestic courts of Member
States where proxy actions have, in recent years, been en-
couraged.62
In March 2002, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in-
vited the Court to reconsider its case law on the standing of indi-
viduals to bring actions under Article 230.6" The context was an
61. See, e.g., Extramet Industrie SA v. EC Council, Case C-358/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-
2501, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619; Timex Corp. v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82,
[1985] E.C.R. 849, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 550; Metro-SB-Gro[3markte GmbH & Co. KG v.
Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875.
62. Adam Cygan, Protecting the Interest of Civil Society in Community Decision-Making-
The Limits of Article 230 EC, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 995, 995 (2003) (citations omitted).
63. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Uni6n de Pequeflos Agricultores v.
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action brought by an association of farmers seeking the annul-
ment of a Community Regulation that significantly amended the
common organization of the market in olive oil. The applica-
tion was dismissed by the Court of First Instance, 64 and the appli-
cants appealed to the Court of Justice, arguing that they were
denied effective legal protection because of their inability to
challenge the legality of the Regulation in national proceedings,
which might result in a reference to the Court under Article 234.
Advocate General Jacobs couches his plea for the Court of
Justice to reconsider the case law on individual concern in the
language of fundamental rights:
38. As is common ground in the present case, the case-law of
the Court of Justice acknowledges the principle that an indi-
vidual who considers himself wronged by a measure which de-
prives him of a right or advantage under Community law
must have access to a remedy against that measure and be
able to obtain complete judicial protection.
39. That principle is, as the Court has repeatedly stated,
grounded in the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Moreover, the Charter of funda-
mental rights of the European Union, while itself not legally
binding, proclaims a generally recognised principle in stating
in Article 47 that "[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right
to an effective remedy before a tribunal."
65
Extensive analysis of the case law led Advocate General Ja-
cobs to propose to the Court that a new interpretation of the
notion of individual concern should be adopted, as follows: "In
my opinion, it should therefore be accepted that a person is to
be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure
where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure
has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his inter-
ests."6 6
In May 2002, the Court of First Instance had before it a case
Council of the European Union, Case C-50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. 1.
64. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, Case T-
173/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3357.
65. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores, [2002]
E.C.R. at 1-6692, 38-39, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 1-6698, 60, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 23.
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in which a challenge was made to a regulation that established a
Community system for fisheries and aquaculture.6 7 The Court of
First Instance adopted the reasoning of Advocate GeneralJacobs
in dismissing the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Com-
mission.
In July 2002, the Court of Justice handed down its decision
in the Uni6n de Pequefos Agricultores case. 68 The old order was
restored. The Court declined to follow its Advocate General and
re-asserted its earlier case law on the interpretation of individual
concern. Insofar as there was a gap in legal protection, the re-
sponsibility for filling this gap was placed on the Member States
"to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which
ensure respect for the right to effective legal protection."69 Inso-
far as the test of individual concern was concerned, the Court of
Justice felt that it was for the Member States to amend the EC
Treaty to change the system established by Article 230.70 As ex-
pected, when the appeal in the Jigo-Qu&r9 case came before the
Court of Justice, it followed its decision in the Uni6n de Pequerios
Agricultores case and allowed the appeal.71
The interest of this case from the perspective of citizenship
and fundamental rights is that citizens are entitled to good gov-
ernance, which includes the ability to challenge measures that
do not meet required standards of legality, but that remedy will
extend to all adversely affected by the challenged measure.
Hence, it becomes a fundamental rights issue where the benefi-
ciaries are all those affected by poor governance, whether citi-
zens or not.
This leads to questions about what exactly are citizens rights
as distinct from rights available to all. The answer relates to cer-
67. Jfgo-Qu& & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.RP 11-2365,
2369-70, 1 1, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 44, 1142.
68. See Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6737, 1 49, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. at 21.
69. Id. at 1-6734, 1 41, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47.
70. Note that Article 111-365 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
provides: "Any natural or legal person may .. .institute proceedings against an act
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to him or her,
and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and does not entail
implementing measures." Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. III-
365, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C 310/1, at 159-60 (2004). This Treaty is as yet unratified, and
has been rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands.
71. See Commission v.J~go-Qu-r6 & Cie SA, Case C-263/02P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425,
[2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12.
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tain distinct participation rights, such as the ability to stand for
election to local or central government representative bodies, to
protection when abroad, and to freedom from immigration con-
trol. In the context of citizenship of the Union, the key rights
are freedom from immigration control in the Member States of
the European Union, and a right to be treated equally with na-
tionals of the Member State of residence when that is not also
the State of which the individual is a national.72 The extent to
which citizens of the Union enjoy freedom from immigration
control has been explored elsewhere by this author,73 and briefly
discussed earlier in this Article. In brief, all citizens of the Union
have a right to move and reside in the Member State of their
choice provided that they do not present an unreasonable finan-
cial burden on the host Member State.74 The constitutional
right to equal treatment of all citizens of the Union by their
Member State of residence is, however, a particularly topical
area, which not only tests the commitment of the Member States
to collective social solidarity, but also draws into the picture the
extent to which differential treatment of third country nationals
and nationals of other Member States is, or should be, permissi-
ble.
IV. EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
in matters within the scope of the EC Treaty has always been a
foundational principle of the Community and Union. 7 5 In the
early days of the Community, the prohibition of discrimination
belonged to the market integration model, and was targeted at
removing obstacles to economic activity.76 That approach had to
develop organically as social integration became a stronger fea-
ture of the ever-closer union of peoples envisaged by the EC
Treaty. Now that the prohibition of discrimination has become
72. See EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 18, O.J. C 325/33, at 45 (2002); see also Opin-
ion of Advocate General Jacobs, Criminal Proceedings Against Bickel & Franz, Case C-
274/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7637, 7645, 24, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 348, 356.
73. See, particularly, Robin C.A. White, Free Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizen-
ship of the Union, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 885 (2005).
74. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
75. See generally MARK BELL, ANT-DIscRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2002).
76. See id. at 143.
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attached to citizenship of the Union, its constitutional status has
been confirmed. Advocate General Jacobs stated in his Opinion
in the Bickel & Franz case that "[f] reedom from discrimination
on grounds of nationality is the most fundamental right con-
ferred by the Treaty and must be seen as a basic ingredient of
Union citizenship."
77
Taken without any qualifications, this would mean that any
citizen of any Member State present in a State other than that of
his or her own nationality must be treated in exactly the same
manner as nationals of the host State in the same situation. Any
difference of treatment would need to be objectively justified on
grounds that did not relate to the nationality of the individual.
Such a proposition concerns Member States particularly in rela-
tion to access to public benefits. 78 While Member States are gen-
erally very welcoming of nationals of other Member States work-
ing, studying, or living there who are self-sufficient and healthy,
concerns soon emerge when the prospect arises of the mover
needing the support of the State for financial assistance or medi-
cal assistance.79 In the Trojani case, the Advocate General said:
"The basic principle of Community law is that persons who de-
pend on social assistance will be taken care of in their own Mem-
ber State."8"
Earlier in his Opinion, the Advocate General had com-
mented:
10. As Community law now stands, this right of residence has
the following principal characteristics:
(a) The right of residence is a fundamental right of every Eu-
ropean citizen. That right may be restricted as little as possi-
ble.
(b) Community law recognises as a ground for limiting that
right the interest of a Member State in preventing any unrea-
sonable burden being placed on the public finances.
77. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bickel & Franz, [1998] E.C.R. at 1-7645, 1
24, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. at 356.
78. See generally ANNE PIETER VAN DER MEI, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: CROSS-BORDER AcCESS TO PUBLIC BENEFITS (2003).
79. Note that those present in a Member State other than that of their permanent
residence are entitled to emergency medical treatment under Regulation (EEC) No.
1408/71.
80. Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Trojani v. Centre Public d'Aide
Sociale de Bruxelles, Case C-456/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7573, _, 70, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R.
38, 837.
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(c) In the EC Treaty a distinction is made between economic
migrants and non-economic migrants. Both groups have a
right of residence, the only difference being the scope of
their respective claims. Economic migrants have the stronger
claim. Thus, they do not need to prove that they can provide
for themselves.
(d) The Court interprets the concept of worker broadly. This
tends to strengthen the right of residence to the greatest ex-
tent possible. 81
The solution the Court has found to the balancing of sup-
porting integration while not alarming some Member States as
to the potential costs in terms of social and medical assistance
has been to permit Member States to operate non-discriminatory
tests that determine the genuineness and depth of the non-na-
tional citizen's links with the host Member State. Where non-
national citizens have become sufficiently integrated into the
host Member State, they must be granted equal treatment in
terms of access to all manner of benefits that may be available to
nationals of the host Member State.8 2 Some Member States have
responded to this line of case law by introducing new tests for
access to certain benefits that apply equally to their own nation-
als and to nationals of other Member States.8" Other Member
States still retain what are essentially nationality links to access to
benefits, 4 and these are likely to come under increasing attack
as being inconsistent with the constitutional right to equal treat-
ment that flows from holding the status of citizenship of the
Union.
Some examples from the case law will illustrate the point.
In the Collins case, 5 the Court ruled that a work seeker was enti-
tled to equal treatment with nationals and, reversing earlier case
81. Id. at 826, 10.
82. See Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits, 42 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2005).
83. These can prove problematic. For a discussion of the United Kingdom's re-
sponse to free movement of workers from eight of the ten countries that joined the
Union on May 1, 2004, see Philip Larkin, The Limits to European Social Citizenship in the
United Kingdom, 68 MOD. L. REv. 435 (2005).
84. As in Office Nat'l de l'Emploi v. loannidis, Case C-258/04, [2005] E.C.R. -,
[2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 47, where a benefit was refused on the sole ground that the applicant
had completed secondary education in another Member State. This was contrary to the
prohibition of discrimination in Article 39 of the EC Treaty.
85. See Collins v. Sec'y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-138/02, [2004] E.C.R.
1-2703, -, 58-64, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 8, 182-83; see also Michael Dougan, The Court
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law,8 6 that the work seeker was not excluded from eligibility for
social assistance. A Member State, however, could have a non-
discriminatory test of residence as the means of establishing a
genuine link with the host Member State in order to gain access
to social assistance.8 7 Such a test must be transparent and pro-
portionate. In the Bidar case,88 access to financial support for
higher education studies could be conditional upon residence in
the United Kingdom for a certain time, but could not be subject
to a test of settlement in the United Kingdom for immigration
purposes which could never be attained by the applicant in the
case. Again, the length of residence entitling a person to access
to financial support had to be proportionate.8 9 Here, the cer-
tain time might be measured in years rather than months, as in
the Collins case. This presents some uncertainty about the mini-
mum periods of residence that will constitute a genuine link for
the purpose of public benefits of differing kinds.
In the above cases, there was no doubt that both Collins and
Bidar had a Community right to be in the United Kingdom-
Collins was a work seeker, and Bidar was a student. But, in the
Trojani case,"0 the Court indicated that entitlement to equal
treatment under Community law was not an entitlement only for
those with a Community right to reside in the host State. If the
host Member State chose to permit a person to reside under na-
tional law, that too would trigger entitlement to equal treatment
with nationals of the host Member State. Trojani did not meet
any of the conditions for entitlement to reside under Commu-
nity law, but he was the holder of a residence permit issued
under national law by the municipality of Brussels.91 The posi-
tion adopted by the Court is entirely logical. Citizenship is a fun-
Helps Those Who Help Themselves... the Legal Status of Migrant Work Seekers Under Commu-
nity Law in the Light of the Collins Judgment, 7 EUR. J. Soc. SECURITY 7, 11 (2005).
86. Centre Public de l'Aide Sociale, Courcelles v. Lebon, Case 316/85, [1987]
E.C.R. 1-2811, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 337.
87. See Michael Dougan, Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of
Migrant Education Within the EU?, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 943, 972 (2005).
88. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119,
[2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 3; see Dougan, supra note 87, at 971. The issue of equal access to
higher education also arose in a different context in Commission v. Austria, Case C-147/
03, [2005] E.C.R. -, [2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 23.
89. See Bidar, [2005] E.C.R. at -, 54, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. at 91.
90. Trojani v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale de Bruxelles, Case C-456/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-7573, [20041 3 C.M.L.R. 38.
91. See id. at -, 30-46, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. at 843-45.
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damental status; it cannot be switched on and off. But the
Trojani case does raise something of a dilemma. It could en-
courage Member States to check the status of nationals of other
Member States residing in their territory rather more vigorously
than many do at the moment, and that would not be consistent
with a liberal entitlement to free movement.
Once Member States introduce non-discriminatory tests of
the genuineness of links with the host Member State, then a
question must arise as to whether such tests should not also ap-
ply to third country nationals in the same situation. Such mat-
ters are not yet regulated by Community law, though Commu-
nity law is not blind to the migration of third country nationals
into the European Union and the consequences of such move-
ment. One example will suffice to illustrate the response. The
Community system for the coordination of social security among
the Member States was extended in 2003 to nationals of third
countries.9 2
Finally, passing reference must be made to the new Citizen-
ship Directive,93 which not only casts many of the economic free
movement rights as rights of movement flowing from citizen-
ship, but also addresses the question of entitlements to social
and medical assistance for those with a Community right to re-
side. Whether the periods referred to in that Directive are now
indicative of the periods needed to establish a genuine link re-
mains to be seen. The Directive provides that there is no entitle-
ment to social assistance in the first three months of residence,
nor to financial assistance for education until permanent resi-
dent status is acquired, that is, after a period of residence of five
years.9 4
CONCLUSION
Once again the Court of Justice has constitutionalized a
concept in the EC Treaty by adopting an overtly integrationist
92. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 859/2003 Extending the Provisions of Regu-
lation (EEC) 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) 574/72 to Nationals of Third Countries
Who Are Not Already Covered by Those Provisions Solely on the Ground of Their Na-
tionality, art. 1, O.J. L 124/1, at 2 (2003); see also Council Directive No. 2003/109/EC
Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents, ch.
2, O.J. L 16/44, at 47-50 (2004).
93. See supra note 27.
94. See Citizenship Directive, supra note 27, art. 24(2), O.J. L 229/35, at 45 (2004).
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approach to the interpretation of the Treaty provisions. In so
doing, it has effectively called upon Member States to engage in
much greater social solidarity than in the past. Then, it was pos-
sible to argue that a Member State had little responsibility for
nationals of other Member States who fell on hard times during
a period of residence in the host Member State. Now, provided
that the national of the other Member State has, as a matter of
fact, achieved a sufficient level of integration with the popula-
tion of the host Member State, the national of the other Member
State, by virtue of being a citizen of the Union, is entitled to be
treated in exactly the same way as a national of the host Member
State. It may be too soon to re-write the comment of the Advo-
cate General in the Trojani case cited earlier in this Article that
persons who depend on social assistance will be taken care of in
their own Member States. However, the case law seems to be
moving inexorably in the direction of requiring a proviso to the
Advocate General's comment where the citizen of the Union has
achieved the requisite degree of integration into the society of
another Member State. That makes citizenship of the Union a
very valuable status for the nationals of the Member States.
